Author Profile: Arushi is a vibrant and creative student studying in grade 12 at The Shri Ram School. She resides in Delhi with her family and is involved in many community-building activities in her neighbourhood. Arushi has helped many lower-income children improve their literacy levels through tutoring and mentorship. Passionate about making an impact on society, she hopes to pursue her undergraduate studies in Sociology and Anthropology.
Abstract
A crucial component of India’s post-Cold War stance is its relations with North Korea. Since 1962, India and the Democratic People’s Republic Korea (DPRK) have worked closely together. They assist each other on a variety of issues relating to international affairs and cooperate closely at the level of multilateral organizations. This research article offers insights into the context behind India’s current policies towards North Korea, which is a delicate balance of historical ties, regional security concerns, and international alignment. In the interest of fostering New Delhi’s Act East Policy, a strong case for maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region through this relationship is made.
- Introduction
New Delhi has sustained ties with Pyongyang for over 47 years, reflecting the legacy of India’s commitment to the Non-Alignment Movement. This meant that India was cooperating with nations that the West termed ‘problematic’ even after the Cold War ended. The regime of North Korea under Kim Jong-un, which has been heightening tensions in the Korean Peninsula through the usage of nuclear and ballistic missile tests is included in this (Armstrong, 2011).
Instead of adopting exclusionary tactics towards the oft-criticized North Korea, India has made active efforts to engage in “dialogue diplomacy”. Indeed, India is one of only 25 countries in the world that has a consulate in the DPKR. Through the process of Foreign Office Consultations (FOC), there is a regular and meaningful exchange of opinions on bilateral matters of shared interest and concern (Panneerselvam, 2016). The goal is to establish peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula while acting as a bridge between North Korea and the West.
2. Current India-North Korea Relations
India and DPKR have concluded multiple bilateral agreements in science, technology, cultural exchanges and information technology. In May 2018, India’s former Minister of State for External Affairs, General V.K. Singh visited Pyongyang at the DPRK’s invitation to mark 45 years of diplomatic ties. The trip was followed by a second meeting with the DPRK’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho in August 2018 on the side-lines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Singapore. Prior to Singh’s visit, India appointed a Foreign Service officer to North Korea, Atul Malhari Gotsurve. As the new Ambassador, Gotsurve was featured prominently in the media for meeting and dialoguing frequently with North Korea’s leader.
New Delhi also accepted Pyongyang’s officials under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program (ITEC). North Korea has thus been a partner state since 1993. It has availed grants to send representatives to India for professional training and participation in programs in English language, education planning, administration, and development as well as implementation and management of computer software applications. New Delhi has also, on occasion, approved North Korean diplomats in its Professional Course for Foreign Diplomats (PCFD) at India’s Foreign Service Institute (Dorn and Fulton, 1997). However, since 2016, in response to global concerns that North Korean participation in space and satellite technology courses may have involved transferring knowledge that could be applied to the DPRK’s nuclear program, India limited these training activities.
Additionally, India has been extending humanitarian assistance to DPRK, which has suffered food shortages during the last few years due to natural calamities. The assistance provided from India included consignments of winter blankets, rice, wheat, baby food, polythene sheets among other essentials. India also donated medicines for the victims of the Ryongchon train blast. India has also provided food assistance worth USD $1 million through WFP in 2011, and again in 2016 (Fishman, Harrell and Rosenberg, 2017).
The DPRK Government also donated USD $30,000 to the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund for people affected by the tsunami of December 2004. Adding to this, in 2023, India’s gesture of providing medicinal products including anti-tuberculosis medicines highlights India’s longstanding medical diplomacy with North Korea.
Cultural cooperation initiatives between India and DPRK have also been plenty. Incoming and outgoing cultural troupes were sent over the last few years under the Cultural Agreement signed in 1976. Furthermore, The Korea-India Friendship Association (KIFA) was established in February 1970 by the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (CCRFC) to foster friendly relations and to project India’s cultural image in DPRK.
3. Challenges Ahead for India-DPRK Engagement
A. Pyongyang’s Nuclear Ambitions
India has frequently condemned the DPRK’s nuclear programmes and voiced its concerns about the country’s aggressiveness while still maintaining diplomatic ties. This has resulted in a number of confiscation actions against North Korean ships and support for US operations, such as countering a North Korean aircraft thought to be transporting cutting-edge ballistic missile technology to Iran (Seong-Ryoul, 2009).
India is increasingly treating North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program as a threat to Indian national security, giving it a greater stake in the North’s denuclearization and regional stability (Nanda, 2018). However, North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons in the immediate future or its further development of longer-range ballistic missiles. India is therefore unlikely to have much influence over North Korea or function as an effective intermediary. What part India can play in bringing Pyongyang closer to the international community is uncertain. India sees a potential serious warming of relations between the US and North Korea as a chance to talk to Pyongyang about its own interests.
B. The Pakistan Connection
Even more worrying for India is North Korea’s swiftly rising relationship with Pakistan. The 2018 visit to Pyongyang highlighted New Delhi’s concerns regarding this matter. In response, the DPRK stressed that “as a friendly country,” North Korea would “never allow any action that would create concerns for India’s security” (Kim-Hummel, 2016).
Despite such reassurances, there is a longstanding “illegitimate nuclear technological nexus” between Pyongyang and Islamabad, including Pakistan’s transfer of nuclear technology to the DPRK, that has always concerned India. Following India’s trade ban in 2017, Pakistan enhanced its trade volume with the DPRK and became one of its largest export destinations. New Delhi’s enhanced engagement could give Pyongyang an incentive to disentangle the Pakistan-DPRK nuclear connection.
C. Declining Trade Relations
Additionally, bilateral trade between India and DPRK declined during the recent past due to the latter’s financial crises. According to recent statistics from the financial year 2016-17, India’s exports to DPRK was USD $44.99 million and imports were USD $85.39 million. However, in recent adherence to the UNSC sanctions, India has banned all trade except for food and medicine with DPRK (Seong-Ryoul, 2009). At the moment, there appears to be no signs of resuming former trade relations.
4. Recommendations
India conveyed the need for the presence of a Western-friendly state to facilitate necessary “mutual dialogue” to resolve issues. As they seek to ease tensions with Pyongyang and advance towards disarmament, New Delhi’s ties to Pyongyang and its allegiance to Washington and Seoul may be helpful. New Delhi must position itself as a critical channel of communication with Pyongyang for the rest of the world (Armstrong, 2011). For this, India can continue strengthening its bilateral ties with Pyongyang, particularly in the areas of trade, investments, economic assistance, and diplomatic exchanges. Hence, its aspirations to play a more significant mediating role among the major protagonists may become more realistic as it emerges as a key Asian power.
The extent to which India can carve out such a role for itself, however, would invariably depend on the North’s willingness to abandon, or at least pause, its WMD program—which appears unlikely now.
Conclusion
India has stepped up its efforts to achieve the challenging objective of strengthening its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. It is also working to develop deeper linkages and political alignment with the US, Japan, and South Korea in the face of China’s assertive nationalism and unilateral attempts to change the territorial status quo, from its border with India to its illegal claims in the South China Sea. However, India’s unique strategic alliances with these three nations can make engagement with North Korea a difficult diplomatic manoeuvre at a time when US-DPRK relations are severely strained (Roy, 2017).
India’s foreign policy towards North Korea reflects a pragmatic and cautious approach. The former is seeking to balance its historical ties with careful adherence to international norms and obligations, particularly in relation to North Korea’s controversial nuclear programs. Hence, India’s engagement with North Korea should be driven by a combination of historical, regional, and strategic considerations.
References
- Armstrong, Charles K. “Trends in the Study of North Korea.” The Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 2 (2011): 357–71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41302310.
- Chari, P. R. “Recent Developments in North Korea: Repercussions for North-East Asia and the World”. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2009. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09353.
- Cho, Seong-Ryoul. “North Korea’s Security Dilemma and Strategic Options”. The Journal of East Asian Affairs 23, no. 2 (2009): 69–102. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23258186.
- Dorn, A. Walter, and Fulton, Andrew. “Securing Compliance with Disarmament Treaties: Carrots, Sticks, and the Case of North Korea.” Global Governance 3, no. 1 (1997): 17–40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800153.
- Fishman, Edward, Harrell, Peter and Rosenberg, Elizabeth. “A Blueprint for New Sanctions on North Korea”. Center for a New American Security, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06213.
- Justin, Kim-Hummel. “Diplomatic Relations with the DPRK: India as a Global Case Study”. Global Politics Review 2, no. 1, April 2016: 50-64. https://www.globalpoliticsreview.com/publications/2464-9929_v02_i01_p50.pdf
- Nanda, Biren. “The Regional Security Outlook in the Indo-Pacific: An Indian Perspective.” Edited by Ron Huisken, Kathryn Brett, Anthony Milner, Ric Smith, Philips Vermonte, and Jusuf Wanandi. CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2018. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22262.8.
- Panneerselvam, Prakash. “Advancing India’s Relationship with Japan and South Korea: Quest for Middle-Power Cooperation”. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08992.
- Roy, Denny. “Misunderstanding North Korea.” East-West Center, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06455.
- Smith, Hazel. “Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the ‘Securitization’ Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 76, no. 3 (2000): 593–617. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2625957.
- Tayal, Skand R., and Sandip Kumar Mishra. “India and the Republic of Korea: A Growing Strategic Partnership.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 7, no. 3 (2012): 321–30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45341836.